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Game-theory course
Jim Ratliff’s graduate-level course in game theory
§ 1 Strategic-form games
§ 2.1: Strategic dominance
§ 2.2 Iterated dominance & rationalizability
§ 3.1 Nash equilibrium
§ 3.2 Computing mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of 2 x 2 strategic-form games
§ 4.1 Introduction to extensive-form games
§ 4.2 Strategies in extensive-form games
§ 4.3: Solution concepts in extensive-form games
§ 5.1 Introduction to repeated games
§ 5.2 Infinitely repeated games with discounting
§ 5.3 A Folk Theorem sampler
§ 6.1 Static games of incomplete information
§ 6.2 Perfect Bayesian equilibria of sender-receiver (signaling) games
§ 6.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of extensive-form games
Search
Search
Nuance Abounds
Welcome
About
Contact
Privacy Policy
Categories
Game Theory
LaTeX
WordPress Meta
Game-theory course
Jim Ratliff’s graduate-level course in game theory
§ 1 Strategic-form games
§ 2.1: Strategic dominance
§ 2.2 Iterated dominance & rationalizability
§ 3.1 Nash equilibrium
§ 3.2 Computing mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of 2 x 2 strategic-form games
§ 4.1 Introduction to extensive-form games
§ 4.2 Strategies in extensive-form games
§ 4.3: Solution concepts in extensive-form games
§ 5.1 Introduction to repeated games
§ 5.2 Infinitely repeated games with discounting
§ 5.3 A Folk Theorem sampler
§ 6.1 Static games of incomplete information
§ 6.2 Perfect Bayesian equilibria of sender-receiver (signaling) games
§ 6.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of extensive-form games
Search
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