We define a strategy for a player in an extensive-form game as a specification for each of her information sets of the (pure or mixed) action she would take at that information set. One such strategy for each player constitutes a strategy profile for the extensive-form game.
Every extensive-form game can be expressed as a strategic-form game.
We incorporate uncertain exogenous events into the extensive form by introducing Nature as a nonstrategic player who acts randomly. We learn how to construct the strategic-form of an extensive-form game when Nature takes a turn at bat.
We study two different types of randomized strategies in extensive-form games. The behavioral strategy specifies randomizations at each information set independently. The mixed strategy specifies randomizations over pure extensive-form strategies. Behavior strategies do not permit correlations across information sets that mixed strategies allow. However, we show that, in extensive-form games satisfying perfect recall, mixed and behavior strategies can be used interchangeably in a precise sense. We learn how to convert back and forth between the two types of randomized strategies.
We define how to restrict an extensive-game strategy to a particular subgame.